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Theoretically,  uniform  trade taxes (uniform  tariff-cum-subsi-
dies) are equivalent  in effect  to devaluations  of the commercial
rate in a dual  exchange  rate system  - if one disregards  smug-
gling and customs  fraud. When  either form of illegal  trade is
factored  in,  this  equivalence  is broken,  and  the  real  exchange  rate
may  actually  appreciate  in response  to an increase  in the  uniform
trade tax rate.  When illegal trade takes the forn of customs
fraud, the rate for exportables  will depreciate,  but the rate for
importables  will appreciate.
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dThe author of this paper analyzes the macroeco-  government finance into the analysis of illegal
nomics of uniform trade taxes - uniform tariff-  trade.  One of the primary results of a UTCS
cum-subsidies, or UTCSs - by comparing  scheme, when there is illegal trade, is to transfecr
UTCS policies as an alternative to devaluation  income from the public to the private sector.
of the exchange rate.  This revenue shock is likely to add to the
welfare burden of the UTCS scheme, when the
The model he sets up establishes a basic  govenmment  cannot levy lump-sum taxes.
equivalence between UTCS schemes and
devaluation of the commercial rate in a dual  Second, he would add investment to the
exchange rate system.  This equivalence disap-  model and investigate the relationship between
pears when smuggling and customs fraud are  investment response, the real exchange rate, and
incorporated into the model.  fiscal revenues under a UTCS when the govem-
ment does not have lump-sum taxes. The taniff
In the flexible price, full employment world  component of a UTCS satisfies the govem-
of the model, a UTCS scheme can change the  ment's relative prce  and revenue objectives
real exchange rate if either smuggling or cus-  simultaneously, but the export subsidy compo-
toms fraud is going on.  What is striking,  nent brings out a conflict between the two
however, is that when smuggling is factored in,  objectives. The govermment  may therefore have
using a UTCS to raise the relative domesdc  an incentive to renege on the export subsidy
price of traded goods may backfire and.  actually  component of the package.
appreciate the real exchange rate. If customs
fraud is factored in, the real exchange rate will  Finally, a parity change (devaluation) or a
appreciate for importables but will depreciate for  UTCS scheme could be used to alleviate transi-
exportables.  tional unemployment due to sticky nominal
wages in the short run.  The author suggests
The author suggests further extensions to his  examining the tradeoffs between the direct
model for a reasonably full understanding of the  contractionary effects of the two policies and
macroeconomics of UTCS schemes.  First, he  their expansionary effect through the tradeables
would incorporate distortionary means of  product wage.
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The purposo of  this  paper  Is  to  analyze  the  mcroeconomics of  uniform
trade  taxes  uwder  capital  nobility  and currency  convertlbllity.  Since  uniform
tariff-cum-subsidy  (UTCS) policits  are  often  proposed  as alternatives  to
devaluation  of  the  exchange  rate,  we  emphasize  the  comparison  between  these
alternatives,  as  well  as  the  intermediate  came  of  a  dual  exchange  rate  system.
We  do  the  analysis  in  a  two-period,  representative  consumr  framwork,  in
order  to  bring  out  the  iportance  of  the  time  path  of  the  alternative
policies.  The  nodl is  idealixed  In  most  respects,  but  should  morv as  a
usoful  benchmark  for  further  analysis  in  more  realistic  settings. 1
The  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  In  Section  1,  we  set  up  a  model  based
an  Adas and  Groenwood  (1985),  with  exogenous  output,  lump-sum  taxes,  no
gsvernomnt  sponding,  and  perfect  capital  mobility.  The  model  is  aimed  at
1  This  paper  was motivated  by  the  UTCS  scheme  recently  instituted  in
Cote  d'Ivoire.  Cote  dlvoire  is  a  member  of  the  West  African  Monetary  Union,
a  group  of  countries  whose  coion currency  (the  CFA  franc)  is  freely
convertible  into  French  francs  by  agreemnt  with  the  French  Treasury,  which
guarantees convortibility  by  extonding  overdraft  privileges  to  the  Union's
Central  Bank  (see  Krum (1985)).  Increases  in  domestic  inflation  starting  in
the  mid  1970s,  together  with  the  recent  nominal  appreciation  of  the  French
franc  and  significant  nominal  depreciations  in  neigboring  Ghana  and  Nigeria,
have  produced  roal  appreciations  in  Cote  dl'voire  and  a  number  of  other  CFA
countries.  This  has  led  a  number  of  authors  (e.g.,  Krum (1987),  *  varajan
and  da  Halo  (1987))  to  suggest  that  an  optimal  macroeconomic  policy  package
would  include  a  devaluation  of  the  nominal  exchange  rate,  if  it  were  not  for
Cots  d'Ivoire's  responsibilities  to  the  CPA  Zone. The  argument,  and  the
rationale  for  the  UTCS  scheme  that  is  currently  in  place  in  lieu  of  a  parity
change,  is  that  sluggishness  of  domestic  price  adjustments  is  making
adjustment  to  terms  of  trade  shocks  and  lnternational  borrowing  shocks
excossively  contractionary.  Initial  experience  with  the  UTCS  has  not  boon
encouraging,  however;  there  is  anecdotal  evidence  of  widespread  overinvoicing
of  Liports,  and  there  has  Leen  late  payment  by  the  government  of  the  export
subsidy.  The purpose  of  this  paper  is  to  provide  a  theoretical  framework  in
which  these  and other  macreoconosic  aspects  of  UTCS  schemes  can  be  analyzed.
We  assume  perfect  capital  mobility  because  the  CFA  countries  have  mintial
capital  controls  regarding  transfers  with  France,  and therefore  "import"  the
relatively  free  French  regime  regardlng  capital  account transactions.
1distinguishing  the  real  balanc  and  real  interest  rate  effects  of  the
alternative  policies,  and  forns  the  basis  for  later  sections.  We  show  that  in
this  model,  a  UTCS  Is  identical  in  all  real  respects  to  a devaluation  of  the
conmerolal  exchange rate  in  a dual  exchane  rate  system.  Both policies  Impose
capital  losses  on all  existing  financial  wealth,  both  ehange  tho  real  Interest
rate  only  if  they  are  anticipated  to  be  temporary,  and neither  affects  the
domstic  nominal  lnterest  rate.
Section  2  adds a nontrLded  good  to  the  wodel  In  order  to  study  real
xchangs  rate  effects.  When  prices  are  flexible,  permanent  changes  in
exchange rates  ov  uniform  trade  taxes  feod  directly  through  to  the  price  of
nontradeablos,  leaving  the  dosestic  price  of  traded  goods  relative  to
nontradeds  unaffected.  Teporary  policies,  in  contrast,  affect  the  current
real  exchange rate  by  altering  the  real  Interest  rate.
The results  of  Sections  1  and 2 establish  a basic  equivalence  between
UTCS  schemes  and devaluatlons  of  the  coomercial  rate  in  a dual  exchange rate
system.  Sections  3  and  4  demonstrate  that  this  equivalence  is  broken  In  the
presence  of  illegal  trade.  We  deemphasize  monetary and intertemporal
considerations  here  and analyz.  a simple  three-sector  model augoented to
incorporate  illegal  trade.
In  Section  3,  we model traditional  smuggling  as  an  activity  using  up
domestic  resources.  We show  that  an  increae  in  trade  taxes  drives  down  real
income  by  drawing  resources  into  smuggling,  thereby  producing  negative  supply
and  demand  shocks  in  both  the  tradeables  and  the  nontrad:ables  sectors.  The
effect  of  this  on  the  real  exchange  rate  ic  ambiguous;  If  the  nontradeables
sector  has  a  relatively  low  income  elasticity  of  demand  or  a  relatively  high
cross-elastLeLty  of  supply  with  respect  to  the  UTCS  rate,  a  rise  in  the  UTCS
2rate  will  actually  *Uoori-t the  real  exchnge  rate,  rather  than  achieving
the  desired  deproeciatLon.  Equivalenco  with  exchange  rate  changes  is  broken  as
long  *  prices  are  flexible,  since  a  depreciation  of  the  comercial  rate  does
not  alter  the  wedge  (if  any)  between  international  and  dometic  prices  of
traded  goods  and  thus  does  not  increase  incentivex  for  illegal  trade.
Soction  4  deals  with  custoos  fraud,  which  does  not  use  real  resources  but
affects  the  real  ezchange  rate  through  its  effect  on  the  relative  price  of
tradod  goods.  We show that  a  rise  in  the  UTCS  rate  raises  the  tax/subsidy-
inclusive  terms  of  trade,  leading  to  a  reallocation  of  resources  towarLs
exportables  and  a  rise  in  the  price  of  nontradeables  relative  to  iuportables.
Section  5 givoe  a  briof  discussion  of  the  role  that  devaluations  and  UTCS
schemes  can  play  in  alleviating  transitional  unemployment  after  a
contractionary  economic  shock.  Section  6 concludes  the  paper.
1.  A Two-Period  Model
As  in  Adams and  Greenwood (1985),  the  reprosentative  consumr  maximizes
(1)  U(.)  - U(c 1)  +  U(C2)
where  ct  is  consumption  of  an  imported  good,  ubject  to  the  intertemporal
budget  constraint.  Financial  welth  can bo  hold  in  the  form  of  domestic  monty
or  interest-bearing  foreign  nominal  bonds.  Domestic  noney  is  held  to
economize  on  transactions  costs;  if  real  income  and  money  balances  In  terms  of
imports  are  Yt  and  at  then  transactions  costs  are  v(mt/yt)yt,  where v
1 s  0,
v " >  0,  and  v  e  [0,11.  A  proportion  v(.)  of  output  is  therefore  lost  due  to
3transactions  costs. 2
The  government  has  four  instrumens  in  period  t:  (1)  the  commercial
exchange  rate,  St;  (2)  the  financlal  exchange  rate,  *t;  (3)  a  uniform  ad-
valorea  tariff/subsidy  rats  st  applying  to  imports  and  exports;  and  (4)  lump-
sun  tex.s,  Tt. Th*  privatt  sector's  budget  constraint  in  period  t-1,2  reads
(2)  Ptct  - [1  - v(  x)IlPxtXt  Tt  (Rt  1 1tl1)  *  ot-lBt.
r(  e  t-)
wtere  Pt  - (l+St)EtPt  and  Pxt  - (l+st)KtPxt  are  the  domstic  prices  of  the
importable  and  exportable,  Kt  is  the  nominal  money  stock,  Xt is  the  economy's
endowment of  the  exportable  good,  it  is  the  foreign  nomlnal  interest  rate,  and
St ls  the  private  sector's  holding  of  forelgn  nominal  bonds. 3
Deflating  by  the  before-tariff  price  of  importables,  EtP*t.  and  defining
St  ' (St-st)/et  as-tNo  percentage  gap  between  the  coimercial  and  finoncial
exchange  rates,  the  budget  constraints  in  real  terms  for  periods  I  and  2 are
(3i)  (l+s1)cl-  [l-v(  (+s1)Y  )1(1+s1)y  V  - 1 (-+g+)  a
*  m2  |a
(3b)  (l+s 2)  2 I  [l-v((j+"2)3(l+s 2 )y  - 12  - a2 +  (l+92)(1+W  )
+  ,(l+r)b
(1+62)
2  at  is  end-of-period  real  money  balances.
3  We  assume  in  (2)  that  there  are  no  illegal  transactions.  See  Sections
3  and  4  below.
4re  Yt  - PxtXtt*t - (1+t)(P*t/P*t)Xt  is  the  real  value  of  output,  ft 
bt  are  the  real  values  of  lump-am  town  and foreign  bondholdings,  s*t - (  -
P*t.l)/P't  l Is  the  foreign  iuflatior  rate,  St  - (It  - t-l)/t-l  is  the  rate  of
depreciation  of  the  comercial  excbh-e  rate,  and  ao  is  the  real  value  of
initial  fitaial vealth:
+  ei(l+i*)so  (1+rl)bo (4)  a-+  a.  +
(4)  *0PI.  l  +  (121i)(14+W) (  l+g)
Notice  that  we have  imposed  the  terminal  conditlon  32  - 0 in  writing  (3b).
Howevor, m2  > 0;  money is  still  held  at  the  end of  period  2  inec  transactions
services  during  the  period  depend  on  end-of-period  money balances.
Equation  (2)  Implies  that  a  unit  of  consumptlon  invested  in  foreign
bonds  In  period  t-l  yields  (Pt.l/*t.-l)(l+it)(*t/Pt)  units  of  consumption  in
perLod  t.  SubstitutLng  for  the  domestic  prlce  of  the  iLportable  using  Pt  -
Et(l+st)P*t,  the  real  consumption  rate  of  interest  is  therefore  given  by
(l+i)(l+st, 1)(l+Fgt.)  __________
(5)  l+rt  - (l+*1t)(l 4st)(l+gt)  (-4s  t)(l4-t)
as  one  can  conflrm  by  eliminating  bl  from  equations  (3a)  and  (3b).  To get  the
socond equallty  tn  (5),  we deflned  growth  rates  6  and  'y  in  the  trade  tax
factor  (l+s)  and  the  relative  exchange  rate  factor  (1Fg):
SConsumption  nd soney  demands are  characterized  by  equality  In  the  budget
constraints  and  the  following  three  first-order  conditions:
(6.)  U'(cl)  - p(l+r 2)U  (c 2)
(6b)  v  (..h....)  - l  2
(6b)  ,  (1+)  (l+4*)(l_1
(6c)  V#-  1.
Squations  (6b)  and  (6c)  yilld  money  demand  functLons  ql  - h(i 2)+sj)y  avYd  K2
k  k.(l+s2)Y2,  whore  h'  <  0  and  k  >  0. Velocity  is  constant  in  perLod  2
because  there  In  no  financial  opportunity  cost  to  holding  money  In  that
period;  real  balaces  are  Increased  until  the  marginal  saving  in  transactions
cost  In  equal  to  one  unit  of  foregone  consumption.
Although  the  domestic  real  Interest  rate  is  sufficiont  to  determlne  tho
tilt*  of  privare  consumption  path  by (6a),  the  privato  soctor  mUst know the
time  path  of  taxes  (rl,T2)  in  order  to  determine  its  overall  wealth  and
therefore  the  "level"  of  the  consumption  path. This  leads  us  to  an
examination  of  the  government  budget.
The goverment  faces  two constraints  In  each  period:  the  central  bank
4  NotLce  that  (1+7t)  - (l+tt)/(l+$t),  whero  It  and  & are  the  rates  of
depreciation  of  the  co  mrclal and  finan-Lal  exchange  rate,  respectlvely.
6balanc  sheot  and  the  public  finance  constraInt.  The central  bank  balance
shoot  states  that  *oney  creation  is  the  result  of  foreign  exchange
intervention  or  dbomstLc credit  expansion.  In  nominal  terms.
(7)  Kt w.vCt  +  ZtAFt,
where  hFt  is  the  aount  of  international  reserves  (foreign  bonds)  acqulred
through  excbhng  market  intervention  and  hDC is  the  change  In  domestic  credit
to  the  government. 5
In  real  terms,  the  central  bank  balance  sheot  is  given  by
(8)  Ut  -t  mt/(l+tt)(l+  -)  - +  - ft,l/(l *)
The  government  finance  constraint  states  that  the  differenco  between
expendituro  and  revenue  must  bo  made up  by  domestic  credit  creation  and
foreign  borrowing.  In  nominal  terms,
(9)  -wt  Ot  Tt -*t  -rt  - tLt (3Gt  pt.1) +  Et(BG
where  Gt  and  Tt  are  govermuent  consumptLon  and  lump-sum  taxs, respectively,
Ot  is  the  value  of  central  bank  profits  from  exchange  intervention,  rt  -
StatPt[ct  - (l-v(t))yt]  ic  the  value  of  trade  taxes,  and  Bi  is  foreign  lending
by  the  government.
We  assum that  capittl  gains  and  losses  due  to  exchnge  rate  changes
Ar not onatixzod.  hus,  if  Ft.l  is  the  initial  value  of  foreign  exchange
holdings,  the  change  in  the  domestic  currency  value  of  reserves  is  EtFt  -
St_lFt_l  - AZtFt.l  +  ItAFt  - hAt  +  AFt,  where  EKAt  - AEtFtl  is  the  exchange
equalization  account,  entered  as  a  liabilLty  to  offsot  AEtFt-1  on  the  central
bank's  balance  sheet.
7The  term  te  requires  some  explanation.  When the  central  bani  makes
transactions  ac more than  one  exchange rate,  there  will  generally  be  a
difference  betw  en the  central  bank's  valu ation  of  foroLgn  exchange  acquired
through  lntervention  and  the  amount of  domeste  curreney  actually  used  in  the
Latervention.  We denote  by  9  the  excess  of  the  fore  r  over  the  latter.  In
period  1,  for  example,  9 is  given  by
(10)  *  (  a  *  )IL*J  - 2  -
We  asoum in  equation  (9)  that  both  *  and  Literest  on  the  centrol  bank's
foreign  exchange  holding  are  transferred  directly  to  the  governmnt  account
and therefore  reduee  domsatLc  credit  requirements  one-for-one
In  real  terus,  and  using  the  shorthand  v(t)  - v(ut/(l+st)yt),  the  finane
constraLit  reads
(1l  ,  - t  ,  -t  a  [e-  t.Ct  (I-v(t))Ytl  +  r  (bG,  ftl  t  bG  b
The  terminal  constraints  facing  the  government  are  bg,  f 2 t  0. ImposLng
these  with  equallty,  and  eliminating  pt  from  (8)  and  (11),  we have  the
following  consolLdated  government  budget  constraints  for  periods  1  and  2:
(12a)  8  - 1 -l  s1[c-(lv(l))My 1 [a  - g°  I
(f 1 +  b  - ( 1 +r1 )(fo  +  bo)
8(12b)  t2  - '2  *2  - 2[ 2 (l-v(l))ly 2 Ul2  - 1
. (1+r2 )(fl  +  b1)
The  interpretation  of  these  equations  is  straightforward:  lump-sum taxes  pay
for  goverM*nt  expenditure  and  accumulation  of external  assets  by the
g@0erient  in  each  period,  but  consumers  receive  *  rebate  of  central  bank
profits,  trade  taxes,  seigniorage  revenues,  and  interest  on  the  net  external
asets  of  the  goveruiment.6
The  goverment' Laterteporal  constraint  can  be  derived  by  eltinrAting
net  official  net  foreign  assets  (b?  +  f 1) from  (12a)  and  (12b).  Notice  that
the  government  always  trades  off  consuwption  in  the  two periods  at  the  world
real  interest  rate  r.  This  mons  that  when  there  ic  a variable  4=ul  exchange
rate  sYsten or  toeporary  UTCS  in  place,  the  goverment  and private  sector  face
different  real  interest  rates.  Ricardian  equivalonce  therefore  faLls  in  this
situation.  As we  will  see,  this  provides  a  chbnel  for  real  effects  of  the
varlous  policies  even  in  the  absence  of  other  frictions  like  sticky  prices.
Policy  alternatives
We  can  now  use  equations  (3)  - (6)  and  (12)  to  study  the  differences
between  the  various  alternative  policies.  We  consider  permanent  and  temporary
policies  in  turn,  under  the  assumption  that  the  policies  are  unanticipated  but
6  One can  substitute  (11)  into  (3)  to  verify  that  the  balance  of
payments  identity  holds  period-by-period;  for  period  1,  for  example, we get
([l-v(l)Jyl  - cl  - g1  +  (1+rt)(bo  +  fo))  +  (bo  - bl)  - fl  - fo,  which  states
that  the  current  account  (the  term  in  ())  plus  the  capital  account  (bo  - bl)
equals  the  change  in  reserves.
9that  perfect  foresight  holds  once  the  policieo  are  in  place.
Pormnent  policies
Consider  first  an  unantlcipated  UTCS  or  chane  in  exchange  rates  that
oc§urs  in  period  1  and  In  umderstood  to  be  yormenwnt.  Since  no  future  trade
tax  or  exchange  rate  changes  are  implied,  both  62 and  72  are  zero  in  equation
(5).  Permnent  policies  therefore  have  no  effect  on  tho  real  interest  rate.
From  (6a),  this  mans  that  any  effect  on  current  consumption  levels  onst
operate  through  changes  in  the  consumer's  Initial  wealth.
To  see  how the  wealth  effects  of  the  alternatives  differ,  rewrite  the
real  value  of  initial  financial  wealth  as  follows:
13  I  w°  S  _+sJ  (lr  mrl(l+s+ (13)  (1+31)  (l+6j],(l+* 1) (l  )  +  (1+1)  1
where  bo  and  so  are  real  values  of  inltial  money  and  foreign  bond  holdings.
An  across-the  board  devaluation  (61  - 7l  - 0  t  > 0)  has  the  familiar  effect
of  imposing  a  capital  loss  on  domestic  currency  holdings.  Installation  of  a*
dual  exchange  rate,  with  the  financial  rate  .IgLr  sZtad rolative  to  the
unchanged  commercial  rate  (61  - -0,  71  > 0)  produces  a  capital  loss  for
holders  of  foreign  axsets  but  does  not  affect  tho  real  value  of  wealth
denominatod  in  domestic  currency.  A UTCS  (kl  - 1  - 0,  61 > 0)  or  devaluation
of  the  commercial  rate  in  a  dual  system  (61  - 01  - 71  > 0)  imposos  an equal
percentage  capital  loss  on  *fl  financial  wealth.
Since  the  capital  losses  above  do  not  represent  changes  in  the  economy's
trading  opportunities  with  the  rest  of  the  world,  and  in  the  current  model  do
not  affect  output  (which  is  exogenous),  they  do  not  represent  changes  In
10consumption  possibilities  for  the  economy as  a  whole.  They will  therefore
have  no  effect  on consumption  levels  as  long  as  the  private  sector  correctly
foresees  the  accompanying  taxes  and  faces  the  sm  real  interest  rate  as  the
public  sector.  Both  of  these  conditions  hold  here,  the  first  from  perfect
foresight,  and  the  second  from  the  fact  that  the  policies  are  permanent.
Effects  on money demand,  and  therefore  (given  the  path  of  domestic
credit)  on  the  balance  of  payments,  vill  depend  on what  happens  to  the
nominal  interest  rate.  Since  interest  parity  holds,  i2 moves one-for-one  with
anticipated  depreciation  of  the  financial  exchange  rate.  This  means that
permaAent  policies  have  no  effect  on  real  money dmand,  since  they  do  not
affect  anticipations  regarding  changes  in  the  financial  exchange  rate.  Theme
policies  lover  the  real  money supply  on  impact,  however,  thereby  producing  an
ezcess  demand  for  money  and  a  corresponding  balance  of  payments  surplus.
The rebuilding  of  money balances  by  the  private  sector  happens  instantly,
however,  and  has  no  real  effects  given  the  frictionless  environment  and
perfect  capital  mobility.  To restore  the  initial  lI-el  of  real  money
balances,  the  private  sector  simply  sells  foreign  bonds  to  the  central  bank  in
return  for  domestic  currency.  These  foreign  exchange  market  interventions  by
the  central  bank  change  the  istributfni  of  domestic  holdings  of  foreign
bonds,  but  not  the  overall  amount held.  Since  the  private  sector  internalizes
the  goverment  budget  constraint,  the  desired  increase  in  liquidity  is
achieved  with  no  loss  in  real  wealth. 7
7  The result  that  devaluations  are  neutral  even  in  the  short  run  under
perfect  capital  nobility  and  Ricardian  equivalence  is  due  to  Obstfeld  (1981,
1986a).  It  is  important  for  this  neutrality  result  that  central  bank  reserves
earn  interest,  that  prices  are  flexible,  and  that  the  prlvate  sector  has  the
sme planning  horizon  as  the  government.
11Temporary policie
Equation  (5)  sakes  three  things  clear.  Firxt,  as long  as  tsere  is  some
prospect  that  tariff/subsidy  levels  will  change  over  time  (i.e.,  *2 '  0),  a
UTCS  alters  the  real  interest  rate  facing  the  private  sector.  A  UTCS  that  is
announced  today  but  belioved  to  be  temporary  ('1  > 0 and *2  - 0,  *°  62 < 0)
makes  consumption  today  expensive  relative  to  consumption  in  the  future;  if
substitution  effects  dominate  wealth  effects,  this  rise  in  the  real  interest
rate  will  man an improvemnt  in  the  current  account.
Second, a  temporary  UTCS  is  equivalent  in  its  effects  on  the  real
interest  rate  to  an anticipated  change  in  the  gap between  the  comercial  and
the  financial  exchange rates  in  a dual  exchange rate  system.  This  is  apparent
from the  interchangeability  of  S and i  in  (5):  any  time  pattern  of  wedges
(gl.g2)  between  the  co mercial  and financial  rate  can  be  reproduced  by a
combination  (51a92) of  uniform  trade  taxes.  A temporary  UTCS  therefore  works
just  like  an expected depreciation  of  the  financial  rate  (with  the  comnercial
rate  fixed)  or  an  xpected  appreciation  of  the  coiercial  rate  (with  the
financial  rate  held  fixed).
Finally,  a temporary  UTCS  and  a variable  dual  exchange rate  system are
equivalent  in  their  effect  on  the  real  interest  rate  to  a  subsidy  to  foreign
lending.  To see this,  simply  rewrite  (5)  as (l+r2)  - (l+r1)(l-
162/(1+62)1)(1-172/(1+72)1);  setting  72  - 0  (for  example),  a  subsidy  at  rate  s
on principal  and interest  income from  International  londing  has  exactly  the
same  effect  on  the  real  Interest  rate  as a temporary  UTCS  satisfying  -
62/(1+6 2)  - 8,9
8  The equivalence  of  a dual  exchange  rate  systeo  to  a tax  on principal
and  Interest  on  foreign  bonds  is  eophasized by  Adams and  Greenwood (1985).
12A temporary  UTCS  will  thercfore  tend  to  raise  the  real  interest  rate  and
produce  a  current  account  improvemnt  (the  opposite  would  occur  if  the
tariff/subsidy  level  were  expected  to  JZa).  What about  effects  on  the
balance  of  payments?  Again,  by  interest  parity,  the  domestic  nominal  interest
rate  is  governed  by antieLpated  novesents  in  the  exchange  rate  applied  to
financial  transactions.  A  UTCS  will  therofore  have  portfolio  implications
only  if  it  changes  expectations  regarding  future  changes  in  the  financial
exchange  rate.  In  the  absence  of  such  effects,  real  money demand  will  be
unchanged,  and  the  balance  of  payments  improvement  (given  the  path  of  nominal
doinstic  credit)  will  be  identical  to  the  improvement  under  a  peranent
UTCS.  10
Potential  S  port  ac  of  portfolio  effects
The balance  of  payments  effects  of  temporary  and  permanent  UTCS  policies
depend  crucially  on how these  policies  affect  oxpectations  regarding  the
financial  exchange  rate.  Although  our  model  is  too  stylized  to  address  this
Issue  formally,  it  is  worth  noting  here  that  Important  portfolio  issues  may
arise  if  implementation  of  a  UICS  erves  as  a  signal  of  an  underlying  balance
of  payments  problem.  The mechanism is  simple:  to  the  degree  that  the  tax
policy  raises  subjective  probabilities  of  devaluation  of  the  financial  rate,
(either  alone  or  as  pert  of  an  across-the-board  devaluation),  it  will  raise
9  Note  that  the  effect  of  S  on  the  real  interest  rate  can  be
circumvented  by  increaing  the  lag  between  delivery  and  payment  for  imports
and  exports.  A UTCS,  on  the  other  hand,  can  only  be  circumvented  by  smuggling
or  faked  invoicing  (see  Sections  3  and 4  below).
10 The  change  In  the  private  capital  account,  however,  will  depend  on
how large  a  current  account  improvement  is  produced  by  the  higher  real
interest  rate;  if  the  current  account  improves  sufficiently,  the  private
capital  account  may  even  improve,  in  contrat  to  the  permanent  UTCS  case.
13the  dosestic  interest  rate  and  cause  a  portfolio  shift  away  from  domestic
currency  towards  foreign  bonds.  If  the  interest  elasticity  of  money  dmnd  is
high  enough  (in  the  current  model,  this  depends  on  the  curvature  of  v(  )),  the
overall  balance  of  payments  may wvel  deteriorate.  If  there  is  a  limit  on
international  borrowing  by  the  central  bank,  it  may be  impossible  (without
other  policy  action)  for  the  authorities  to  rule  out  an  equilibrium  in  which
implementation  of  the  UTCS  leads  to  self-fulfilling  expectations  of  a  balance
of  paymnt.  crisis  and  devaluation  of  the  financial  rate.
2. ontreded  goods  and  the  ral exchange  rate
Suppose  now that  the  economy  receives  an  endowment  ln  each  period  of  a
second,  nontraded  consumption  good. The  real  exchange  rate  is  given  by  the
price  of  the  rntraded  good relative  to  the  price  of  the  iportable:
(14)  qt  nL
Budget  constraints  are  identical  to  before,  except  that  current  real
consumption  is  now  at  - 4 + qtcf  and  real  Income at  international  prLeos  is
Yt  - (P.t/Pt)Xt  +  qtNt where  Nt  is  the  endowment  of  the  nontraded  good.
FLrst-order  conditions  are  as  given  in  (6),  along  with  the  conditions  UNt -
qtUrt  characterizing  the  optimal  within-period  allocation  of  consumption  (Ujt
ls  the  partial  derivative  of  the  within-perLod  utility  function  U(cN,cT)  with
respect  to  cj).
Consider  usLng  the  three  alternative  policies  (across-the-board
devaluation,  devaluation  of  the  commercial  rate  relative  to  the  financial  rate
In  a  dual  system,  or  UTCS)  to  achieve  a  given  depreciation  In  the  real
14exchange  rate  on  Impact.  As before,  If  these  policies  are  regarded  an
permannt,  there  will  be  no  effect  on  the  real  rate  of  interest  expressed  in
terms  of  Imports.  A variable  UTCS, however,  or  an  anticipated  change  in  the
wedge  betweon  the  com_ercial  and  finncall  rates  N M  zhange  the  rel
Interest  rate.  As  In  the  earlier  case,  an  anticipated  depreciation
(appreciation)  of  the  financial  rate  relative  to  the  coercial rate  or  an
anticipated  decrese  (increase)  in  the  tariff/subsidy  rate  will  raise  the  real
intere,ut  rate  expressed  in  terms  of  imports.
As *  phasixed  by  Dornbusch  (1983),  what  happens  to  the  current  account  as
a  result  of  these  pollcies  will  depend  on what  happens  to  the  price  of
nontraded  goods.  An increase  in  the  rate  of  appreciation  of  the  real  exchang
rate  will  tend  to  reduce  the  real  consumption  rate  of  interest  and  worsen  the
cui rnt  account,  while  a  fall  in  the  rate  of  approciation  will  tend  to
Increase  the  reel  interest  rate  and  improve  the  current  account.
3.  llegal  Trade  and  UTCS Schmens,  I:  Smugglin
Any tax  scheom sets  up  incentives  for  evasion.  The possibility  of
evasion  satters  for  at  least  three  reasons:  (1)  evasion  may use  up  real
resources  both  in  the  attempt  to  evade  and  in  enforcemnt;  (2)  successful
evasion  may alter  the  income  distribution  between  the  prlvate  and  public
sector;  (3)  successful  evasion  may  affent  the  relative  prices  facing  agents
at  the  margin,  and  thus  underminr  the  resource  allocation  objectives  of  the
original  policy. 1 1
There  are  many possible  forms  that  illegal  transactions  ight  take,  given
the  gcvernent  interventions  that  we  are  studying.  In  the  dual  exchange  rate
11 Note  that  (2)  and  (3)  do not  necessarily  represent  socLal  costs.
15systm,  for  exanple,  although  the  budget  constraints  (2)  are  written  under  the
assumption  that  foreign  bonds  can  only  be  accumulated  by  first  acquiring
foreign  exchange  at  the  financLal  rate  from  the  central  bank,  It  may be
possible  for  iuporters  or  exportert  to  borrow  and  lend  internationally  at  a
different  real  intorest  rate  simply  by  Increasing  the  lag  between  shipment  and
paymAnt. 1 2 Moreover,  the  coexistence  of  two  s*parate  exchange  rates  In  a  dual
system  may  even  nct  up opportunitios  for  pure  arbitrage. 13
With respect  to trade  taxes,  the  key  casumption  in  equation  (2)  is  that
smaggling  and  customs  fraud  are  ruled  out. In this  section  and  the  next,  we
ask  how  the  possibility  of illogal  transactions  alters  the  conclusions  of
Sections  1 and  2.  To focus  on the  impact  of illegal  trade,  we do the  analysis
in flexible-price,  full-employment  models  in  which  the  various  policies  have
no  real  effects  In  the  absence  of illegal  trade. Our  key  result  ls that  the
possibility  of illegal  trade  breaks  the  equivalence  we have  been  emphasizing
between  UTCS schemes  and  changes  in  the  commercial  exchange  rate. When  wages
and  prices  are  flexible,  exchange  rate  changes  may  well  have  Dt impact  on
smuggling  incentives;  in  contrast,  the  level  of illegal  trade  is  a
nondecreasing  function  of the  uniform  trade  tax/subsidy  rate,  and is  strictly
increasing  above  some  minimum  UTCS rate.
This lack  of equivalence  survives  when  prices  or wages  are  sticky,  as
12  Suppose,  for  example,  that  the  financial  rate  were expected  to
appreciate  relative  to  the  commercial  rate (7  < 1 in  equation  (5)). An
exporter  could  avoid  the  implied  lower  real  interest  rate  by retaining  export
earnings  from  period  1  abroad  and  repatriating  them  In  period  2,  with
interest,  at the  comercial rate.
13  Suppose  that  unilateral  transfers  from  abroad  take  place  at the
co mercial  rate,  and  that  the  financial  rate  is  appreciated  relative  to the
co ercial rate.  Individuals  can  then  collect  the  difference  between  the  two
exchange  rates  by smuggling  out  exports  and  receiving  payment  in the  form  of
an  (apparently)  unrelated  unilateral  transfer.
16long  as  the  costs  of illegal  activity  are  denominated  in traded  goods.  Uhen
costs  are  denominated  partially  in  nontraded  goods,  however  (as  they  would  be,
for  example,  if  smuggling  used  domestic  labor),  price  and  wag,  stickiness
provides  a  channel  through  which  a  devaluation  can  affect  the  incentives  for
illegal  trade.  This  restores  a  partial  equivalenco  between  exchange  rate
changes  and  UTCS schmes.  We show  that  equivalence  is  not  complete,  however,
since  a  devaluation  that  achieves  a  given  real  depreciation  on  impact  will
have  a  smaller  effect  on  muggling  incentives  than  the  corresponding  uTCS
schem.
Since  intertemporal  issues  are  secondary  here,  we  look  at  one-period
models  of  illegal  trade.  We also  demphbasize  monetary  issues,  since  the
existence  of  illegal  trade  does  not  add  Important  new monetary  dimensions  as
long  as  completely  free  convertibility  is  maintained  (as  we  will  assumo). 1 4
The  remainder  of  this  section  is  devoted  to  a  model  of  pure"  sm"uggling
ln  which  illegal  trade  is  carried  out  wlthout  the  cloak  of  legal  trad.  In
Section  4,  we  study  a  model  of  customs  fraud,  in  hich  legal  and  illegal  trade
are  inextricably  linked.  The  two  sections  together  glve  a  fairly  complete
vLew  of  the  effects  of  UTCS schemes  and  exchange  rate  changes  ln  the  presence
of illegal  trade.1 5
14  Pltt  (1984)  and  Macedo  (1987)  analyze  models  in  which  tariffs  and
export  taxes  give  rise  to  a  black  market. This  does  not  occur  as long  as
convertibility  is  maintained  with  "no  questions  asked'  about  the  source  or
destination  of foreign  exchange  obtained  by  private  individuals.
15  In the  classic  bhagwati  and  Hansen  (1973)  analysis,  the  costs  of
illegal  trade  are independent  of the  magnitude  of legal  trade. Pitt (1981)
pointed  out  that  this  assumption  determines  some  key  features  of  the
resulting  equilibrium.  Our first  nodel  follows  the  classic  Jhagwati  and
Hansen  (1973)  analysis  in  this  rospect. The  custems  fraud  model  of Section  4
follows  Pitt (1981)  In  giving  a central  role  to the  linkages  between  illegal
and legal  activity.
17A Model of  Sm%gglqng
In  the  model  of  this  section,  a competitive  smuggling  Industry  uses
domestic  rvsources  to  bring  goods past  the  customs  authorities.  We follow
Ihagwati  and  Hansen  (1973)  in  assuming  that  illegal  trade  i  a  co  plotely
separate  activity  from  legal  trade.  The key  iuplication  of  this  separation  is
that  swuggling  does  not  affect  the  domestic  prices  of  traded  goods  urless  the
marginal  costs  of  smuggling  are  so  low  that  legal  trade  is  driven  out
completely.  This  allows  us  to  focus  on  the  real  resourco  costs  of  illegal
activity  and  on  the  income  redistribution  from  the  public  to  the  private
sector.
The  addition  of  smuggling  mans  that  there  are  potentially  five
activities  or  sectors:  production  of  the  exportable  and  importable,  production
of  the  nontraded  good,  and  suggling  of  the  xportable  and  importable.  Since
the  domestic  relative  prico  of  tradeablem  is  unaffected  by  smuggling,  however,
we can  consolidate  tradeables  into  a  single  composite  good.  This  leaves  us
with  three  sectors:  production  of  tradeables  and  nontradeables,  and  smuggling
of  tradea:los.  Each  sector  uses  domestic  labor  along  with  a  sector-specific
factor  whose supply  is  fixed  in  the  short  run.  Labor  is  perfectly  mobilo
between  sectors,  so  there  is  a  single  economy-vide  nominal  wage.
Production  and  smuling
Letting  the  subscripts  T,  N and  a  denote  the  traded,  nontraded  and
s*uggling  sectors,  respectively,  we  will  assume that  the  production  functions
Qj(Lj)  have  the  properties  Q(O)  - 0,  Q'  >  0  and  QU  <  0.  Qg  is  the  number  of
units  of  traded  goode  s  uggled  into  the  economy.  We  are  modeling  smuggling  as
18simply  another  domestic  activity  operating  under  docreasing  returns  to
scale. 16  The  price  received  for  a  unit  of  smuggled  goods  Ls the  wedge
between  the  domestic  aid  the  world  price  of  the  good;  as  long  an  sauggling
,ccurs  under  increasing  marginal  costs  and  legal  trade  is  not  driven  out  in
equilibrium,  the  marginal  source  of  supply  of  tradeables  will  be  legal  trode,
and  the  domestic  price  will  simply  be  the  UTCS-inclusive  world  pricea1 7 ivt
revenue from  a  unit of  *uuggling  is  therefore  1(l+s)4  - XF*r  - st4  18
If  all  activities  are  purely  comptitive,  labor  will  be  allocated  so 
to  maifize  net  domestic  revenue  from  the  three  activities.  Denoting  the
maimized  value  of  nat  revenues  by  R,  we  have  R - Max (U1+s)IQT  +  +NQ  +
laQO  subject  to  LT +  I  L+ s  L,  where  4  and  QT are  the  Zoreign  price
and domstic  production  of  tradeables,  Q5 is  the  quantity  of  tradeables
smuggled  into  the  country,  and  Lj  is  the  quantity  of  labor  used  ln  sector  3
Since  R is  homogeneous of  degree  one  in  all  prices,  we can  deflate  by  the
domestic  price  of  tradeables,  U(1+s)4,  to  gst  real  not  revenue,
r(lq,s/(l+s);L),  where  q - PN/(l+s)1 4 is  tho  real  exchange  rate.  The
revenue  function  r  has  the  property  that  its  partial  derivatives  are  the
16  By assumLng that  the  smuggling  activity  uses  domestLc  resources,  we
are  departing  from  the  traditional  approach  ln  which  the  costs  of  smuggling
are  denominated  in  traded  goods  (Bhagwati  and  Hamaen (1973),  Pitt  (1981),
Martin  and  Panagariya  (1984)).  Our  approach  is  equivalent  to  Sheikh's  (1974)
assumptLon  that  smuggling  requires  a  domestically  produced  nontraded  good  s
input.
17 Since  world  prices  of  tradeables  are  fixed,  this  justifies  our
consolidation  of  imports  and  exports  Into  a single  composite  tradeablo  good
(it  is  also  essontial  for  this  that  the  UTCS  schea itsolf  has  no  direct
effect  on  the  relatlve  price  of  tradeablos).
18 We are  proceeding  as  if  there  were  a  dometic  market  for  both
tradeable  goods.  In  this  case,  all  the  sauggler  has  to  do  is  to  get  the  good
into  the  country.  Uhen exportables  are  not  consumed domestically,  there  is  a
separate  probleu  of  collecting  the  subsidy,  which  requlres  re-exporting  the
good.  This  cost  would  be  included  ln  the  form  of  Qs(La).
19supply  functions  for  the  three  sectors.
Consu ttom  -nd  taxes
Since  illegal  trade  leaves  the  price  of  domestic  tradeablos  unaffected,
expenditure  on  consumption  is  simply  2(1+*)P  cT  +  PNcN. We  denote  the
minisixed  value  of  experditure  for  any utility  level  U  by  Z(Z(l+s)14,1P;U). 19
Since  Z is  homogeneous  of  degree  one  in  all  prices,  we  can  write  the
xpendituro  function  In  terms  of  tradeables  as  Z/3(14s)P4  - t(l,q;U);  the
partial  derivatives  of  c  are  the  compensated  demand  functions.
The representative  consumer  has  disposable  income  Y - R - T, here  T  Is
lump-sum taxes.  Although  snuggling  Is  privately  profitablo,  it  does  not
contribute  to  mocial  disposable  income.  This  is  clear  when we consider  the
goverment  budget  constraint.  Assuming that  the  goverment's  only  role  is  to
collect  trade  taxes  and rebate  them as lump-sun  transfers  to  the  conumer,  we
have  T  - a[EPx(Qx + Ks - Cx)  - E*  (cx  - - HM)],  where  Xs,  Qx.  and  ex  are
productlon,  consumption,  and  smuggling  of  exports,  all  measured  in  term  of
the  composite  tradeable  good  (and  similarly  for  the  importable).  This  implies
T  - sc  P[QT  +  Q.  - cTJ,  which  can  be  further  simplified  by  noticing  that  the
balance  of  trade  is  zero  (QT  - cT). Deflating  by  the  domestic  price  of
tradeables,  and  noting  that  Qg - r3,  we  have  r  v [s/(1+s)lr 3 :  lump-sum taxes
aro  exactly  equal  to  net  revenues  from  illegal  trade. 20 From the  social  point
19  We are  ssuming  the  existence  of  a  representative  consumr,  which
requires  that  preferences  be  Identical  and  houothetic  or  that  there  be  a
benevolent  govern  cnt  controlling  the  Income distribution  through  lump-sun
taxes.
20 Notice  that  by  homogeneity  of  degree  1 of  i.  the  consumer's  disposable
Income,y,  is  given  by  y  - r  - r  - rl  +  qrq  +  [s/(l+s)1r3  - [s/(14s)1r3  - rl  +
qrq. Only  directly  productive  activitios  contribute  to  social  disposable
income.
20of  view,  snuggling  is  nothing  more  than  a  costly  way  of generating  a
rodistribution  of income  within  the  private  sector.
Iquilibril
The  following  two  equations  completely  characterize  equilibrium:
(15)  C(l,q;U)  r(l.  .q. 2;L)  - (l+)(+s)  3
(16)  a  (l,q;U) - (l,qo  L)
qq
The  first  of these  states  that  the  labor  market  clears,  the  economy  is
on its  overall  budget  constraint,  and  the  government  budget  constraint  is
satisfied;  the  second  is  the  uark.t-clearing  condition  for  nontraded  goods.
Equations  (15)  and  (16)  jointly  determine  q and  U as functions  of  L  and
s  (the  third  equilibrium  condition,  that  the  trade  balance  be zero,  is
implied  by these  two). Notice  that  the  nominal  exchange  rate,  S, does  not
appear  in the  equations.  This  means  that  changes  in  E  have  no real  effects  in
this  economy:  any  devaluatior  is  immediately  oro&dd  by an equiproportional
rise  in  wages  and  the  price  of nontraded  goods. 21 1otice  also  that  when  r3-
0, i.e.,  when the  smuggling  activity  is  prohibitivAly  costly,  the  modal
reduces  to the  standard  dependent  economy  model;  in  particular,  g  and  U  ar
determined  independenelv  of A.  In  the  absence  of smuggling,  therefore,  a
21  This  would  be true  under  price  flexibility  and  perfect  capital
mobility  even  if  money  and  international  lending  were  in the  model  (as  in
Section  1).
21(pormanont)  UTCS  has  no  real  effects,  as  in  our  previous  analysis. 22
Whon  smuggling  iL  present,  however,  changes  in  a  (in  contrast  to  changes
in  3)  do  have  real  effects.  Totally  differentiating  (15)  end  (16),  we  get
(17) [IqU]  ~c:)l3]~
[qq[ qq  (l+s)  q3  ]3
whore the  subscripts  to  c  and  r  denote  partial  derivatives,  and where A -
Is/(l+)lrq3cqU  +  cu(rqq  - eqq)  >  O.21  After  some algebra,  we  got  the
following  expression  for  the  change  in  the  real  exchange  rate  as  a  result  of
changing  the  UTCS  level:
du  (1+-  ) 2 A (qUrl3  £lurq3)
(19)  d-  3  (Arq 3 - rqqr 3 3 l  +  cqqr33)
Consider  first  the  change  in  overall  welfare  due  to  the  UTCS  schew.  By
convexity  of  the  revenue  functlon,  the  term  in square  brackoet  in  (19)  is
nonpositlve;  this  Implies  that  the  entire  exptession  is  negative,  except  at  s
- 0,  where  it  is  zero. 24 UTCS  schmes  are  unamblguously  welfare-worsening  in
22  All  UTCS  policLes  are  permanent  here  since  the  economy lasts  only  a
single  period.
23  one  can  show that  A - rqqelu  - rqlcqU  - cUcqq.  which  is  unambiguously
positive.
24  Under  the  assumption  that  the  marginal  product  of  labor  in  smuggling
goes  to  infinity  as  Q.  goes  to  zero,  one  can  show that  rjs  - 0  for  a  - 0. An
infinitesimal  change  in  s  starting  at  s  - 0  therefore  has  no  effect  on U (or
22this  model:  any  finite  Increase  in  the  UTCS rate  In  the  presence  of swaggling
draws  resources  out  of  productive  activities  and  lowers  welfare.. 25
Consider  next  the  effect  of  a change  in the  UTCS rate  on the  real
exchange  rate.  By  equation  (18),  q appreciates  or depreciates  according  to
whether  eqU/1lU  is less  than  or greater  than  rq3/r13  (recall  that  rij  <  0).
Defining  the  income  elasticity  of demand  for  good  j  as  j  and  the  cros0-
elasticity  of  supply  In  sector  j  with  respect  to  [s/(l+s)j  as  ej3,  the
condition  can  be  written  in  the  form2 6
(20)  *gn  I  - agn (!I - I)
ds  C~T3  PT
The  effect  on  q is  illustrated  In  Figure  1.  where  the  real  exchange  rate
is  determined  by  equating  relative  demand  to  relative  supply  of nontradeables
and  tradeables.  A  rise  In  a  drives  up  the  economy-wLde wage  and  draws  labor
into  the  smugling  activity.  The  effect  on  relative  supply  of  nontradeable.
and  tradeables  depends  on  the  relative  cross-elasticities  of  supply  in  these
on  q).  For  s  > 0,  rj 5 is  strictly  less  than  zero.
25  A related  question  is  whether  the  smuggling  is  itself  welfare-
worsening,  i.e.,  whether  for  a  given  UTCS rate  welfare  is  higher  or  lower  in
the  presence  of  smuggling.  In  this  model,  smuggling  is  unambiguously  welfere-
worsening  (as  in  Bhagwati  and Hansen  (1973)  when  legal  trade  is  not  fully
displaced).  The  reason  is  that  the  UTCS scheme  is  itself  not  a  distortion,  so
that  the  loss  of  productive  resources  due  to  smuggling  occurs  in  an
undistorted  economy.  Sheikh  (1974)  analyzed  the  tariff  case  in  a nodel
similar  to  ours  and  found  that  the  elimination  of  smuggling  might  be
imiserizing  --  i.e.,  that  welfare  could  be  higher  in  the  presence  of
smuggling.  This  possibility  would  clearly  extend  to  any  non-uniform  (and
therefore  distorting)  tariff-subsidy  scheme.
26  The  elasticities  are  given  by  p  - cjuetUc  and  e  -
rj3[s/(l+s)I/rj-  j  - N,T.  In  deriving  (a0),  we use  e  fact  that  in
equilibrium,  t q  - rq  and  el  - rl.
23sectors  with  respect  to  a rise  s/(l+s);  at the  original  real  exchange  rate,
this  amounts  to  asking  which  sector  has  a larger  elasticity  of supply  with
respect  to its  own  product  wage.  The  RS curve  shifts  to the  left  if the
supply  response  is  higher  In  nontradeables,  and  to the  right  if  the  response
is  higher  in  tradeables.  RS is  unchanged  if  eq3/E13  - 1.
On the  demand  side,  the  movement  of labor  into  smuggling  produces  a  fall
in  disposable  income. The  effect  of this  on the  RD curve  depends  on  relative
income  elasticities.  RD shifts  to the  right  if  Aq/0l  <  1; in  this  case,  a
fall  in  income  produces  a  shift  in  demand  towards  nontradeables.  RD shifts  to
the  left  if  nontradeables  have  the  higher  Income  elasticity;  if  Pq - 1  (tho
case  of  homothetic  preferences),  there  is  no effect  on  RD,
A rise  in  a  therefore  has  effects  on  both  the  supply  and  demand  sides.
It Is  quite  possible  that  the  final  result  for  the  real  exchange  rate  will  be
the  oprosite  of  what  was lntended.  WV tend  to get  a real  appreciation  if (a)
the -..... ome  elasticity  of demand  for  nontradeables  is  relatively  low  or (b)  the
cross-elasticity  of supply  of  nontradeables  with  respect  to the  UTCS  rate  is
relatively  high In  nontradeables  as  compared  to tradeables.
Two  Remarks
Remark  1.  We have  assumed  that  the  marginal  product  of  labor  in  the  smuggling
activity  is  infinite  at  Ls  - 0.  With  this  assumption,  any  finite  s,
regardless  of  how  small,  will  call  forth  a  movement  of  labor  into  the
smuggling  activity. 27 There  are  a  number  of  cases,  however,  in  which  a  small
27  It is  not true,  however,  that  an infinitesimal  change  in  s  will
produce  a flrst-order  shift  of labor  into  smtggling  starting  at a  - 0.  An
infinitesimal  rise  in  s starting  at s  - 0  will  produce  a first-order  increase
in smuggling  services,  Qs.  but  it  will  do so  without  drawing  more  than  an
infinitesimal  amount  of labor  from  productive  sectors  (and  therefore  without
24UTCS  may  not  provide  sufficient  incentives  for  smuggling.  This  would  be  true
in  our  model,  for  example,  if  the  marginal  product  of  labor  were  (positive
but)  finite  at  Lx  - 0,  or  if  there  were  fixed  costs  to  initiating  the
smuggling  activity.  In  either  of  these  cases,  we  would  have  r3  - r3j  - 0  for
*  <  i,  i.e.,  a  would  have  to  reach  some  critical  minimum  level  ;  >  0  before
there  would  be  any  snuggling  response.  One  would  also  get  no  real  effects
from  a  UTCS  scheme  in  the  short  run  if  labor  were  immobile. 28 Of  course,  even
in  the  presence  of  fixed  costs  or  a  finite  warginal  product  of  labor  at  v  - 0,
a  sufficiently  large  UTCS,  or  a  rise  in  the  level  of  *  from  a  positive  base
level  with  smuggling,  will  produce  a  supply  shift  towards  s*uugling.
Remark_2.  The  results  in  (18)  and  (19J  establish  an  important  asyeo-try
between  uniform  trade  taxes  and exchange  rate  changes  in  the  pr*sence  of
smu"gling:  only  trade  taxes  have  real  effects.  This  asymmetry becomes  less
clear  when prices  or  wages  are  sticky,  since  then  changes  in  the  exchange  rate
are  capable  of  altering  the  relative  return  to  legal  and  illegal  activities
(provided  that  the  costs  of  smuggling  are  not  denominated  completely  in  traded
goods).  For  example,  suplose  that  there  is  unemployment due  to  a  sticky
economy-wide nominal  wage,  but  the  nontradeables  price  is  flexible,  so  that
the  nontradeds  ma:ket  always  clears  (i.e.,  we are  on  the  border  of  the
Keynesian  and  Classical  unemployment regions  in  a  disequilibrium  framework).
Total  labor  demand is  Ld  <  L:
affecting  overall  income or  utility  to  first  order).
28  With  imobile  labor,  (18)  and  (19)  no  longer  hold.  One can  see,
however,  what  must  happen  in  equilibrium;  nominal  wages  in  all  sectors  must
adjust  to  maintain  real  product  wages  at  their  original  levels,  and  the  price
of  nontradeds  must  rise  in  direct  proportion  to  the  increase  in  tradeables
prices.  There  are  no  real  effects.
25(20)  Ld  (  +  LN(1 +  Ls(E  )  <  L.
Now  consider  a  rise  in  s  or  E  that  achieves  a  given  increase  in  the  domestic
price  of  tradeables,  PT  - E(l+s)Pj  on  impact.  Since  these  policies  lower  the
product  wage  in  the  tradeablas  mector  by  the  same  amount,  they  lead  to  the
smae  increase  in  the  demand  for  labor  there.  The JTCS, however,  has  a  greater
effect  on  overall  labor  demand  mince  .t  lowers  the  product  wages  in  the
smuggling  sector  by  a  larger  amount.  Denoting  the  elasticity  of  labor  demand
in  the  snuggling  sector  by  qT  <  0,  we  have  the  following  expressions  for  the
change  in  employment  in  smuggling:
dlog(  r)  dlog(l) (21)  .lgk)  - 110~mq  >0 dlogPT  a  'ie(*)  dlogpT  a
The employment response  Is  therefore  larger  when the  chang  in  traded
goods  prices  is  achieved  through  a  UTCS  than  when it  is  achieved  through
devaluation.  Both  policies  produce  an  increas,  in  employment and  income,
together  with  expenditure  switching  towards  nontradeds,  at  the  initial  price
of  nontradeds.  There  will  therefore  be  a  rise  in  the  price  of  nontradeds  to
clear  that  market,  leading  to  a  further  increase  in  the  demand for  labor  as
the  nontradeds  product  wage falls.  The final  increase  in  employment and  rise
in  the  price  of  nontradeds  will  be  larger  for  the  UTCS,  however,  given  the
26stronger  Impact  on  employment  in  snagling.  29
Income  distribution  effects
The  final  topic  worth  discussing  in  this  iMple  model  iL  the  effect  of
smuggling  on  incom  distribution.  We have  already  noted  that  smuggling  in
this  nodel  is  nothing  more  than  a  costly  way of  Influencing  the  inco  c
distribution  within  the  private  soctor.  Since  resources  devoted  to  smugglLng
are  *Sply  being  used  to  engineer  a  transfer  of  trade  tax  revenuse  from  the
public  sector  to  mugglers  --  a  transfer  that  the  private  sector  would  hav
received  in  any  case,  through  rebates  of  tax  revenues  --  there  is  no  net
social  benefit  to  offset  the  loss  of  resources.  30,31
The  assumption  of  lump-sNm  taxes  is  important  in  interpreting  smuggling
as  simply  a  costly  way  of  nflnuencing  the  Income  distrLbution  within  the
privat,  sector.  In  a  world  with  lump-sum  taxes,  the  net  revenue  impact
[s/(l+s)]r3  of the  UTCS schoem  is irrelevant,  *Ince  It  can  always  be
unravelled  at  zoro  social  cost  by  lump-mm  taxes.  In  practic,  however,  the
goverment  may  not  have  nondLitortionary  tax  instruments  available,  so  that
the  income  distribution  kJtUg  the  private  nd  public  sectors  may  matter.  In
29 The  overall  welfare  comparison  of  the  two  alternatives  is  unclear:
the  UTCS  creates  more  employment,  but  it  has  more  smugling  and  therefore  a
higher  resource  cost.
30 We  noted  earlier  that  illegal  trade  cannot  deliver  berefLts  in  terms
of  alleviating  policy-induced  distortions,  since  a  UICS does  not  affect  the
relatlve  prices  of  traded  goods.
31  The argunmt  that  smuggllg  is  welfare-worsoning  relies  on  the  action
of  a  benevolent  govern  et  with  access  to  lump-uam taxes.  If  this  assumption
fails,  then  lncome  redistributions  within  the  private  sector  or  between  the
private  and  public  sectors  may  affect  welfare,  *and  it  is  no  longer  clear  that
the  smuggling  equilibrium  li  Parsto  lnferior  to  the  equilibrium  without
mugling.
27this  case  the  adverse  impact  of  muggling  on public  sector  revenues  placo an
additional  welfare  burden  on  the  *conomy
There  will  also  be  additional  effects  on  the  real  exchange  rate  and  other
variables  in  the  absence  of  lump-sum taxes.  Suppose,  for  example,  that  trade
taxes  are  the  only  tax  instruent  available  to  the  govermnnt.  The government
budget  constr&int  would  then  imply  that  either  current  government  expenditure
or  (in  a  dynamic  setting)  future  trdet  tax  rates  or  *xpenditure  must  beccue
*ndogenous.  Effects  on  tho  real  exchang  rate  and  other  variables  will  depend
on where  in  the  budget  the  required  adjustmnt  takes  place.  If  current
government  expenditure  bears  the  burden  of  adjusting  to  changes  in  current
trade  tax  receipts,  for  example,  there  will  be  an  additional  effect  on  the
real  exchange  rate  depending  on  the  relative  consumption  pattorns  of  the
private  and  public  sectors. 32
4. Illegal  Trade  and  UTCS  Schemes  II:  Fraudulent  Involcing
A  channel  for  tariff  avoidance  that  is  important  in  a  number  of
developing  countries  Is  underinvoicLug  of  lmports.  While  the  use  of  official
referonce  prices  or  specific  tariffs  would  seem  an  easy  solution  to  this
problem,  implementation  of  realistic  reference  price  systems  may  be  very
costly  for  nonhomogeneous  imports. 33 In  addition,  solving  the  underinvoicing
32 In  this  case,  if  the  government  had  a  higher  marginal  propensity  to
spend  on  nontraded  goods,  an  incroese  in  souggling  would  draw  demand  away from
the  nontraded  goods  sector  and  put  downward pressure  on  the  real  exchange
rate.
33 Cote  d'Ivoire  is  a  recent  case  of  fraudulent  Invoicing  in  response  to
trade  taxes  (see  footnote  1). As  an  indication  of  the  policy  tradeoffe,  it  is
worth  notLig  that  at  the  time  of  introduction  of  the  UTCS  scheme,  Cot.
d'Ivoire  was  already  gettlng  rid  of  spocific  tariffs  due  to  their
inefficiencies.
28problm  will  Lncreaso  the  lnecetlv,  for  muglLng.  What are  the  lipllcatLon
of  thLs  form  of  illegal  trade?
Although  underinvoicing  and smuggling are both  responses  tax-induced
divergences  between  the  int.rnatLoaal  and  domestic  prices  of  traded  goods,
the  analysis  of  the  previous  section  does  not  carry  over  directly  to  the
undcrinvoiLing  case. There  are  two key differences  in  the  structure  of
costs.  FLrst,  while  lt  was  reasonable  to  thlnk  of  smuggling  as  using  up real
resources  (e.g.,  in  utllizing  inefficient  transport  routes),  underinvoLeing
sisply  involves  producing  a fraudulont  record  of  a transactlon.  The private
cost  of  thLs  activity  may lnclude  brLbes  to  dishonest  officials,  or  penalties
(if  the  underinvoicng  is  discovered  by  an honest  official),  but  lt  seems
appropriate  to  a  first  approximation  to  assum  that  the  activity  absorbs no
real  resources.  The supply-  and demand-side reallocations  that  we
emphasized  ln  the  previous  section  will  therefore  not  play  a  role  bore.
The  second  dlfference  is  that  it  soes less  natural  in  the  underiuvoicLig
case  to  think  of  legal  and  illegal  trade  as  separate  activities.  In  the
suggling  model,  the  aount of muggling  could  be  determined  Independently  of
the  extent  of  legal  trade,  because  smuggling  costs  were  independent  of  the
amount of  legal  trade.  No  such  separation  is  possible  in  the  customs  fraud
case,  aineo  individuals  engaged ln  customs fraud  mst  use (the  appearance of)
legal  trade  as a  cover"  for  their  illegal  activity.  This  neans  that  in
contrast  to  the  earlier  analysis,  a  competitive  equilibrlum  with
underLnvoicLng  will  be  characterized  by  what  Pitt  (1981)  called  "price
dieparity":  the  donestie  prieo  of  the  imported  (exported)  good  will  fall
34 We  are  ignoring,  as ln  the  previous  section,  the  costs  of
enforcemnt.  We  also  ignore  bribes  to  foreLgners;  unlike  domestic  brLbes,
whiLch  are  simply  transfers,  these  amount  to  social  costs.
29below  (above)  the  full  tariff-inclusive  (subsidy-inclusive)  price.  These
relatlv,  price  effects  are  ln  fact  the  key  channal  through  which  customs  fraud
affects  the  real  equilibrium.
We formlize  these  points  below  ln  a  veraion  of. the  static  modl  of  the
previous  section.  To keep  things  syLple,  we  abstract  from  smuggling  and  focus
only  on  fraudulent  involcing.  Since  the  analysis  for  overinvoLcing  of  exports
la  syuwetric  to  that  for  undarinvoicing  of  imports,  we  do  the  full  analysis
only  for  the  latter  case.
For  Liporter  J,  let  us  denote  the  amount of  imports  by  Hj  and  tho  degre
of  underinvoLiing  by  Aj,  where  (1  - Aj)  is  the  ratio  of  the  reported  prlce  to
the  true  world  prieo.  By  definition  of  Aj,  the  importer  choosing  N  and  Xi
deprives  the  government  of  tariff  revenue  of e - SAJEP*Mj.
In  general,  the  (expected)  cost  of  underinvoicLng  should  be  some  functlon
of  the  three  variables  A, V and M. Ue  choose  the  followLng  simple  form:
C(A,WN) - p(A)(bW +  *W), b,a  k  0,  p'  > 0,  p"  2  0.  One possible
literpretatLon,  consLitent  wLth  liporters  being  rLsk-neutral,  is  that  p(.)  is
the  probabliLty  of  being  "caught"  (we require  p(.)  6  [O,1  j  and  bM  +  aW  is  the
penalty  condltional  on  being  caught. 35 An iLporter  who is  caught  therefore
loses  the  illegally  approprlated  tarlff  revenues  W plus  an  addltlonal  amount
35 In  a  smuggllng  context,  (1-Aj)/Aj  can  be  lnterpreted  as  the  ratio  of
illegal  to  legal  iLports  brought  ln  bsy  Lmporter  J.  The smuggler  in  this  case
ts  using  legal  trade  as  a  'cloakw  tc  avoid  detectLon  of  smuggling.  The
analy  ss  here  is  therefore  closely  rAlated  to  that  of  Pitt  (1981)  and  Martln
and  PanagarLya  (1984)  and  Macedo  (1987),  who  speclfy  the  probabilLty  of
detectlon  of  sauggling  as  a  functlon  of  thLs  ratio.
30b*  +  (a-l)V  that  is  proportional  to  the  volume  of  affected  importe36
Total  expected proflt  for  importer  j is  given  by
(22)  I-pB  *_  N  - (I- A)sP *  - p()(b)K +  SW
where  PF  is the  domestic  pric,  of  the  Imported good.  We *samu that
individual  importers  are  Small relative  to  the  domestLi  market  end  therefore
take  Ps  as  parametric.
Given  NJ.  the  optimal  choice  of  A satlfios  the  first-order  condition
(23)  1  - ap(A)  s  (ak  4  ,X,)P  (A)
with  equality  if  A > 0 (we  can  guaranteo  A <  1  by  assuming  that  p(l)  - 1)
For  an  interior  cholce  of  A,  (23)  requires  that  the  marglnal  expected  benefit
of  an  increoe  in  A (which  is  an  iucrease  in  profits  with  probability  1 -
p(A))  equal  the  marginal  expected  cost  (due  to  the  increase  ln  p).
Figure  2  shows  the  determination  of  A gIven  a,  b  and  s. The  curve  LL  is
the  left  hand  side  (lhs)  of  equation  (22);  RR  is  the  rho. Ro31o  is  the  rhs
when  bp (0)1s31*  - 0.  The  diagram  can  be  used  to  derive  the  followLng
conclusions,  whLch  we  will  state  and  then  dLscuss:
Proposition  1  (Optimal  underinvoicing)
(1)  A is  a  continuous  YunctLon  of  a.
36 a,  b,  and  the  parmaeters  of  p(.)  are  presumably  functlons  of  the
government  enforcement  effort.
31(11) lf  b  - 0  and  >  0,  A - > 0.  a constant  (this  implies  A/ds  - 0).
(ili)  if  bp'(O)  >  0,  A  - 0  for  a s  i,  where ;  >  0.
(iv) if  bp'0O)  >  0,  dA/do  >  0  for  s  x  ;
(v)  liA-_.
We now  discuss  (ii)-(v)  in  turn. Property  (ii)  states  that  if  b Il  zero,
the  optiml  degree  of  underinvoicing  ts  some  positive  level  regardless  of  the
level  of  s*  A  rise  In  a increases  the  return  to  underinvoicing,  but  it  also
lncreases  the  expcted  penalty  by  raising  a.  Uhen b  - 0,  these  effects  cancel
out  exactly,  and  there  is  no  net  effect  on  incontives  for  underinvoicing.
Property  (iLL)  states  that  whenever bp'(O)  exceeds  zero,  there  will  be
em  cutoff  lovel  of  a  (denoted  i)  such  that  only  a  UTCS  above  i  will  have n
effect  on  unoerinvoicing  incentives.  A  positive  value  for  bp'(0)  therefore
acts  like  a  fixed  cost  in  the  underinvoicing  activity:  as  long  as  bp'(O)  >  0,
a mall  UTCS  will  have  no  real  effects.
Property  (iv)  states  that  once  the  UTCS  rate  reaches  its  critical  level
a,  ny  further  increases  in  s  will  raise  the  degree  of  underinvoicing.  The
degree  of  underinvoicing  is  therefore  a  monotonically  increasing  function  of  s
for  a  : i.  By  property  (i),  this  Increase  happens  smoothly,  starting  (by
(1ii))  at A  - 0.
Property  (v)  states  that  the  degree  of  underinvoicing  reaches  an  upper
limit  that  is  strictly  below  1  as  s  goes  to  infinity.  ThiL  limit  Is  equal  to
the  degree  of  underinvoicing  that  would  prevail  (see  (il))  if  b  were zero.
Before  turning  to  the  determination  of  Mj,  it  is  worth  noticing  the
relationship  between  A  and  the  exchange  rate.  As  Proposition  2  states,  this
32Ls  *imply  a  matter  of  what  happens  to  b/I  as  l  changes:
Proposition  2  (UnderinvoicLng  and  the  Ixchange  Rate)
(i) if  bp'(O)  >  0  and  a X i,  dA/di  >  (C)  0  lff  dlogb/dlogg  C  (>)  1.
(Li)  if  bp'(O)  - 0,  *  <  i,  or  dlog  b/dlogl  - 1,  dA/dZ  - 0.
The proposition  states  that  a deprecLation  will  raise  the  optioal  degree
of  underimnoicing  only  if  (1)  s  is  at  least  equal  to  its  critical  levl,  and
(2)  the  elasticity  of  b with  respect  to  E is  less  than  one.  The first  of
these  conditions  follows  directly  fron  Proposition  1.  The second  cams  from
the  first-order  condition  (23):  a  chAnge in  E will  raise  A only  if  lt  lowers
b/sgP*
The elast  city  condition  bere  is  simllar  to  our  result  in  the  smuggling
case  that  a  depreclation  had  no  effect  on  smuggling  incentives  if  smuggling
costs  were  a proportional  loss  of  the  *suggled  shipment.  The  asme result
arises  here  when b  is  denominated  ln  traded  goods;  rise  in  e  would  then  lead
to  a  proportional  rise  in  b  (elasticity  - 1),  with  no  change  ln  the  optLmal
degree  of  underinvoicing.
The Domestic  Price  of  lmportables
Given  the  optimal  choice  of  A,  it  remains  to  solve  for  the  jth  iLporter's
optimal  scale,  Nj,  and  the  total  supply  of  imports,  IjMj. The first  of  these
is  solved  by  setting  BUj/OMj equal  to  zero,  and  the  second  by  Imposing  the
*free  entry'  conditlon  Ii  - 0.
Since  profLts  are  linear  In  N (cf.  (22)),  the  importer  will  wish  to
expand  or  contract  without  bound  unless  the  domestic  price  of  the  import
33adjust.  to  brinS  marginal  coat  and  marginal  revenu  exactly  into  balance.  Tho
first-order  conditLon  BHJ/8Ej  - 0  therefore  determines  the  dometic  price  that
must  prevail  lf  i  s  to  be  posltive  and  finite  in  equLlibrium.  Once  this
condltlon  is  satisfied,  however,  the  importer  iL  indifferent  to  the  s*ale of
operations.  Entry  is  therefore  no  longer  an  issue;  the  free  entry"  condition
Nj  - 0  is  automatically  satlifLed  when  OUj/SMj - 0,  and  imports  are  demand
determined. 37
The domestic  price  level  satisfying  #Uj/%a  - Nj - 0,  which  we  call  the
'break  even  price,  Pb.  is  given  by:
(24)  p  - 11  +  (l-(l-ap(A))A)s  +  p(A)gpeJZP
Since  no  underinvoicing  is  done  if  the  break-even  prlce  is  above  the
tarlff-inclusive  price  (1+s)EPm,  the  equilibrium  domestic  price  will  be  the
minimum  of  the  two. This  allows  us  to  define  the  effective  tariff  rate,  on,
as  the  wedge  between  the  international  and  domestic  price  of  the  importable:
(25)  P;  (1 + %)EP  - Min[(l  +  s)EP*  (l  +  (l-(l-ap(A))A)  +  p(A)p*E m m  p',~~~~~~~~~EP*)  P
It  is  easy  to  show that  O  <  n  s  a  and  that  O <  dtv/dss  1.38 The
effective  tariff  is  therefore  between  zero  and  a,  and  rises  monotonically
with  s.  It  is  everywhere  a  smooth,  differentiable  function  of  s.39
37  This  gets  us  around  the  difficult  problem  of  modellng  entry  and  exit.
38  do./do  - 1 - (1  - Ip(A))
39 Differentiability  is  useful  since  lt  implies  that  the  expnditure  and
revenue  functions  are  differentiable  functions  of  s.
34Figure  3  shows  the  effective  tariff  an  as  a  function  of  a. When  b Is
uero,  the  effective  tariff  starts  at  sero  and  rises  linearly  with  *,  with
slope  11  - (1  - sp(i))Is  a  (0,1).  When  b  > 0,  no  underinvolcing  occurs  for  a
S i,  0o  an  - a  up  to  that  point. At a  - *, doWds - 1,  but any  further  rise
In  a  causes  an  to  fall  below  s.  As  a  gets  large,  the  cost  parmtor  b  becomes
less  end  less  important,  and  an  approaches  the  value  it  would  have  had  if  b
Vero  z  ro.40
Tbs  Doesstic  Pric of Uportables
A siailar  analysis  applios  on  tho  export  side,  where  the  incontive  is  to
overinoice  export  good4  in  order  to  collect  a  higher  subsidy  per  unit. The
equilibrium  price  of  the  exportable  satisfies
(26) P_  - (I  +  ay)  X  - Esxl(l  +  *)4ty,(1  +  (l+(l-%p(A))s  + p(A)-p1)  U)
zpx  UT~~~~~~~~~
Without  loss  of  generality,  have  assumd  in  (26)  that  a  and  b  are  the  am  as
they  w*re  n  the  import  case  (this  implies  that  Ax(s)  - AM(s)  and  * - 4)
Figure  3  shows  the  effective  export  subsidy,  whLch  equals  a  for  s  S ;  and  then
rises  monotonically  towards  an  asymptote  of [1  +  (1  - sp(A))Ia.
Iquilibrium
In  thhe  smugling  case,  illegal  trade  did  not  affect  the  domestic  relatiLv
pricos  of  the  traded  goods  as  long  as  there  was  some  legal  trade  in
40  It  is  interesting  to  notice  that  8UWOA - 0  in  equilibriuo.
Increases  in  A do  not  get  passed  on  to  the  domestic  prlce  because  importers
wN4t  be  compensated  for  the  increasod  expected  costs  associated  with  the
higher  degree  of  underinvoicing.
35equilibrium.  This  made  it  possible  for  us  to  consolidate  into  a  single  traded
good. This  consolidation  is  impossible  in  the  customs  fraud  case,  since
illegal  invoicing  in  response  to  a  UTCS  leads  to  a  rise  in  the  domestic
relative  prLce  of  the  exportable.  To  keep  things  simple,  we  return  to  the
basic  structure  of  Sections  1  and  2,  with  exports  and  nontraded  goods  produced
and  imports  and  nontradeds  conumod. We  will  denote  the offectiv  e  terms  of
trade  resulting  from  a  UTCS  at  rate  a  by  4x:  pOx [(l-  x)/(l  um)Ix  2  Px.
Slnce  fraudulent  invoicing  does  not  use  real  resources,  the  production
side  of  the  model  simply  involves  the  allocation  of  labor  between  the  two
production  sectors  (exports  and  nontraded.).  The  value-added  function  R gives
the  maxiized  value  of  output  at  domestic  prices:  R  - Kax(E(l+ax)PQx  *+  PNQN)
st. LX  +  LN  S  L. Deflating  by  the  domestic  price  of  imports,  we  havo
r(4,q;L). The  demand  slde  is  equally  simple:  asuoing  that  traders  h-ve
identical  preferences  to  all  other  consumers,  the  minimimmu real  expenditure
required  to  reach  utility  level  U is  just e(l.q;U).
The  economy-wide  budgoet  constraint  is  a  bit  more  complicated  then  in  the
smuggling  case,  because  we  must  keep  track  of  net  profits  from  fraudulent
involcing.  To  incorporate  invoicing  profits,  denote  by  xD and  xx  the  actual,
raMAIM&  penaltios  on  traders  engaged  in  Importing  and  exporting,
respectively,  measured  in  terms  of  imports  at  the  domestic  price. 41 Replacing
the  expected  penalty  by  the  actual  penalty  in  (22),  realized  profits  are
given  by 4  - N  - [(l+(l-A)s)/(l+8,  jN  - Xm  and  w  - ((l+(l+A)s)/(l+ao)JpxX  -
0  sX-  Xx  Rearranging,  we  have  4  - (l+u*)'(e 3 - s)M  +  wv  - Xm and 4X  -
(1+vn)'s  (-  vx)PxX  + wx - Xx  where  w  and  wx are  the  real  amounts  of  under-
and  over-invoicing,  respectively.  It  follows  that  total  realized  profits  from
41 The  expected  value  of  EPCe. is  p(A)(bM  +  aZ).
36customs  fraud  are wr  m  (1+PM)'1 (  o)  - exX)  where  - v  +  wx  and  X -
XS + Xx &re  th,  total  amounts of  fraudulent  invoicing  and  penalties,
respectively,  and where va  have  used  the  fact  that  the  balance  of  trade,  S  -
IPxX - I?  N,  is  zero.  Domestic  expenditure  therefore  satisfies  Z  - R  - Tr  +
jp*wr,  where  Tr  is  the  realized  value  of  not  lump-sum taxes.
The  governent  budget  constraint  states  that  net  trade  subsidies  are paid
for  by  lump-sum taxes  and  the  realized  value  of  penalties:  Tr  - s(l+Ax)1P -
*(1  Am)RPe  - p(Ax)(dX  +  Vx)  - p(03 )(d(  +  Va).  In  real  terms,  vr  - w  - X$
where we have  again used  the  fact  that  3 - 0.  In  terms  of  its  effect  on
income  the  amount v  X can be  thought  of  an  a  transfer  to  traders  that  is
financed  by  lump-sum taxes  on  all  consumers.
V*  can now  characterize  equilibrium  completoly  using  the  following  throe
equations:
(27)  &(l,q:U) - r(P,q;L)  +
(28)  cq (lq;U)  - rq(x,q;L)
(29)  PX-  ie  Px
Equations  (27)-(29)  jointly  determine  q  and  U  as  functions  of  L,  *,  Px,  and
the  penalty  paramters  b  and  a.
Uhat are  the  general equilibrium effects  of  changes  in  the  UTCS  level?
ConsLder  first  the  effect  on welfare.  The  welfare  results  are  in  fact
qualitatively  identical  to  those  of  Section  3. Totally  differentiating  (27)-
(29),  it  is  easy  to  show that  dU/ds  - 0 if  the  initial  UTCS  lovel  does  not
37exceed  ;. It  the  UTCS  rate  Ls  above  the  critical  level  a,  however,  increases
in  the  UTCS  rate  are  unambiguously  welfare-woreening.  Moreover,  the  illegal
trade  is  itself  welfare-worsening  in  the  sense  that  for  a given  UTCS  level,
welfare  is  lower  in  the  presence  of  customs  fraud.
The  result  that  illegal  trade  is  unambiguously  welfare-worsening  is  In
contrast  to  Pitt  (1981),  who showed  that  illegal  trade  of  the  type  analyzed
here  could  be  welfare-improving  in  the  presence  of  a  combination  of  tariffs
and  export  taxes.  As  in  tho  Section  3,  however,  the  explanation  is  that
unlike  any  combLnation  of  tariffs  and  export  taxes,  or  any  non-uniform  tax-
cum-aubsidy  scheme,  the  UTCS  by  itself  is  not  a  distortion.  Illegal  trade
therefore  has  no  role  to  play  ln  alleviating  the  distorting  effects  of  policy.
In  the  customs  fraud  case,  in  fact,  Illegal  trade  actually  introducas  a
diLtortion  In  tho  form  of  an  "inadvertento  comercial  policy.  This  explains
why customs  fraud  is  welfare-worsening  ln  the  UTCS  context  even  though  the
activLty  does  not  absorb  domestLc  resources.
Now consider  what  happens  to  the  real  exchange  rate. For  simpliclty,
consider  the  case  where  b  - 0,  so  that  ;  - 0  and  even  a  very  small  uTCS scheme
will  provide  incentives  for  illegal  trade.  StartLng  at  a  - 0,  lncreases  ln  a
raise  ox  more  than  one-for-one  and  an  loss  than  one-for-one  (Flgure  3). We
therefore  get  a  rLse  in  the  effectlve  terms  of  trade.  The  demand  effects  of
this  Inadvertent  co  mme  rcial  policy  wash  out  when  there  is  initlally  no  lllegal
trade,  and  the  overall  effect  on q is  determined  on  the  supply  side. Slnce
the  effective  terms  of  trade  improvemnt  produces  a  reellocation  of  domestic
resources  towards  exportables,  the  supply  of  nontradeables  falls  and  there
must  be  a  real  appreciation  ln  terms  uf  importables:
38(30)  - )dql(_d  >  )
ds  s.,u.  r  ae  ds  de'~)>  ~
s-O,b-0qq  qq
Whlel  the  real  exchange  rate  in  terus  of  lmportabls,  q,  *ust  appreciate,  one
can  show that  the  prLco  of  the  nontradeable  does  not  rise  by  enough  to  fully
offset  the  terms  of  trade  improvemsnt.  The real  exchange  rate  in  terms  of
exportables  therefore  depreciates.
These points  are  illustrated  in  Flgure  4,  where we compare  the  UTCS
(which  Improves  the  effectiv  terms  of  trade)  with  an  exogenous  improvemnt  ln
tho  terms  of  trade.  The initial  equilLbrius  iL  at  points  1  in  the  dLagram,
where  in  quadrant  I,  £  - r  at  the  initial  reel  exchange  rate  ql  and  utility
leil  U1 . Introduction  of  a  UTCS  schemo does  not  affect  the  external  terms  of
trade,  and  therefore  leaves  the  balanced  trade  locus  (quadrant  III,  and  the
economy's  consumption  poseLbility  locus  (quadrant  I),  unchanged.  The
consumption  point  moves from  1 to  3,  however,  as  the  real  exchange  rate  ln
terms  of  importables  apprecLates  from  ql  to  q3.  The real  exchange  rate  ln
terms  of  exportables  depreciates,  naking  possible  the  shift  of  resources  out
of  nontradeables  in  quadrant  II.  Accounting  for  invoicLng  profits  and  lump-
sum taxes,  real  expenditure  at  the  domestic  price  of  lmportables  is  C3  - r3  +
sr  - wrr Small  changes  in  q  cause  no  change  in  welfaro,  by  the  Envelop
theorem.
It  is  instructlve  to  compare  the  UTCS  equilibriums  with  what  happens  when
the  sme  effectlve  trms  of  trade  improvement  occurs  as  a  result  of  an
exogenous  change  in  the  external  terms  of  trade.  In  this  case,  the  balance
trade  locus  rotates  downward, and  the  consumption  possibillties  locus  shifts
out,  reflectLng  the  economy's  lncreased  comand  over  imports.  As long  as  both
39goods  are  normal,  the  real  exchange rate  in  terms  of  Lportables  maSt
appreciate;  what  happens  to  the  real  exchange rate  In  terms  of  exportables
depends  on  incom and  substitution  effects. 42 Utility  is  higher  at  U2,  even
for  a  small  change  in  the  terms  of  trade.
S.  Trmitional Unsploymnt
Up to  this  point,  we have  done  our  analysis  in  flexible-price,  full-
employment  models  in  which  purely  nominal  changes  like  devaluations  had  no
real  effects.  While  models  of  this  type  help  bring  out  the  analytical  issues,
they  are  Incauplote  for  some policy  purposes.  In  partLcular,  there  is  no
sense  in  which  the  exchange  rate  (real  or  nominal)  is  ever  "overvaluedm  in
this  kind  of  model.  There  is  therefore  no  reason  for  polLeymakers  to  want  to
change  the  parLty  or  alter  the  price  of  tradbd  goods  in  any  other  way.  In
rias  s*ction,  we  extend  the  comparison  of  devaluations  and  UTCS  schemes  to  one
Important  caso  in  which  the  nominal  exchange  rate  li  overvalued  in  a  well-
defined  sense  before  the  policy  chcnge.
We focus  on a  world  in  which  the  price  of  nontradeables  is  floxible,  but
the  nominal  wage  is  fixed  in  period  1 as  a  result  of  explicit  or  implicit  wage
bargaining. 43 With  a  given  world  price  of  tradeables,  fixlty  of  the  nominal
42 See  Gavin  (1988).  If  the  income  effect  dominates,  consumption  of
the  nontraded  rises,  and  the  real  exchange  rate  in  terms  of  exportables  mst
depreciate.  If  the  substitution  effect  dominates,  consumptLon  and  production
of  the  nontradbable  fall,  and  the  real  exchange  rate  in  terms  of  exportables
appreciates.
43 This  could  be  due  to  nominal  contracts  or  to  unwillinnoss  of  workers
to  accopt  the  fall  in  their  real  wages  relative  to  other  workers  implied  by  a
nominal  wage  cut. Efficiency  wages  are  another  possible  source  of
uneployment,  but  these  constitute  a  real,  rather  than  nominal  wage
stLekLness,  and  It  Is  not  clear  that  efficiency  wages would  adjust  under
prossure  of  unemployment  (as  would  seem  likely  in  the  first  two cexs).
40wage meamn fixity  of  the  product  wage in  tradeabls.  This  has  two  important
implications.  First,  for  given  sottings  of  the  nominal  exchange rate  and
taxes,  the  tradeables  soctor  will  have  a  fixed  demand for  labor  and  will
therefore  be  unable  to  absorb  changes  in  labor  demand in  the  nontradeables
sector.  The  labor  market  therefore  need  not  clear  in  the  short  run.  In
particular,  a  contractionary  e;hock that  drives  down the  price  of  nontradeables
will  lead  to  a rise  in  unemployment.
Second,  with  w and  AT fixed  in  the  short  run,  the  tradeables  product  wage
becomes  a policy  variable:  policymakers  can  Shoose the  short-run  demand for
labor  in  tradeables  by  setting  the  level  of  the  exchange rate  and/or  trade
taxes.  These  polLcies  may therefore  play  a  role  in  maintaining  full
employmnot in  the  face  of  contractionary  shocks.
Figure  5  illustrates  this  role  for  parity  changes  or  UTCS  schmes.  The
initial  equilibrium  is  at  points  ,  vith  a  current  account  deflcit  of  b  > 0
and real  exchange rate  qo. Now  suppose that  the  country  is  cut  off  from
foreign  borrowing,  so that  it  must reduce  its  current  account to  zero  in  the
current  period  (b  - 0). This  borrowing  limit  acts  like  a  rise  in  the
international  interest  rate,  depressing  domand for  current  consumption.  The
price  of  nontraded  goods  must fall,  leading  to  a  fall  in  labor  demand in
nontrad4ables  at  the  initial  nominal  wage. With  flexible  wages,  the  nominal
wage would  fall,  and  labor  would be  reabsorbed  in  the  tradeables  sector  as  the
product  wage  there  fell.  Equilibrium  would  be  at  point  2,  with  a rLse  in  the
nontradeables  product  wage,  a  fall  In  the  tradeables  product  wage,  and  a
depreciation  of  the  real  exchange rate  (to  ql  <  qo).
With  fixed  nominal  wages,  however,  the  short-run  equilibrium  is  at  a
poitnt  like  3,  with  uneployment.  Labor  released  from  the  nontradeables  sector
41cam¢ot be  reabsorbed  in  the  tradeablss  sector,  since  the  coublnation  of a
fixed  world  prlce  and  flxed  nominal  wages  prevents  the  product  wag. from
falling."  The  role  for  a  parity  change  or UTCS is  clear:  *ither  pollcy  can
be  used  to  reduce  the  tradeableo  product  wage  directly  and  (in  the  absence  of
illegal  trade 45)  achieve  the  optimal  allocation  at  point  2.
Cavts
WLth flexible  goods  prices,  perfect  capital  mobility  and  forward-lookLng
consumers,  a  devaluation  or  UTCS Is  unambiguously  expansionary  from  an Initial
posLtion  of unemployment.  If  any  of these  assumptions  fail,  however,  a
devaluation  may  have  contractionary  effects  in  the  short  run  that  offset  the
bensfits  from  falling  product  wages  in the  tradeables  sector. Figure  5  may
therefore  give  an overly  optimistic  picture  of the  role  of  a permanent  parity
chang  or  UTCS as a  device  for  alleviating  transitional  unemployment. 46
A  Assuming  homotheticity  of preferences,  the  equilibrium  must  fall
somewhere  between  points  I  and  4.  Notice  that  whle  one  can  say  that  the
nominal  exchange  rate  ib  overvalued  at  point  3 (given  trade  taxes),  the  real
exchange  rate,  q,  has adjusted  fully  to the  fall  in  demand  for  nontradeables,
and  say  not  be *misaligned"  at all  relative  to  its  full  employment  equLlibrium
level  (i.e.,  the  equilibrlum  may  be at  point  4).  This  shws  that  when  there
Lo unemployment  due  to sticky  wages,  the  familiar  prlce-index  based  real
exchange  rates  may  give  a misleading  indication  of Incentives  for  resource
allocation.
4.5  In the  presence  of smuggling  or customs  fraud,  our  analysis  of
Soctions  3 and  4 indicates  that  the  UTCS is  second-best,  since  it  will lead  to
some  combination  of a  wastage  of  resources  and  an  unintended  commercial
policy.
46  There  are  other  reasons  why Figure  4  may  be overly  optimistic.  As
Buiter  (1988)  points  out,  the  impact  of  a devaluation  on resource  allocation
depends  a great  deal  on the  &QQ  of  underlying  wage (or  price)  rigidities.
If real  wages  were  sticky  due  to lndexation,  for  exmple, then  the  ability  of
the  authorities  to reduce  the  product  wage  in tradeables  would  be limited  by
the  implied  reduction  in  the  real  wage index. If  workers  consumed  only
tradeables,  for  example,  the  authorities  might  find  It Lmpossible  to ralse  the
price  of tradeables  wLthout  causing  an offsetting  rLse  in  the  economy-wide
42On the  demand side,  a  major  potentially  contractionary  influence  of  a
devaluation  is  its  *ffect  on  the  real  value  of  wealth  denominated  in  domeatic
currency.  As we  eWphasidzd  in  Section  2  below,  UTCS  scheme  (or  devaluations
of  the  coo  ercial  rte lin  a  dual  rate  system)  have  oven  larger  potential  real
balance  effects  since  they  reduce  the  real  value  of  A1U  financial  wealth  on
impact,  regardless  of  currency  of  dnonmination.  On the  supply  side,
devaluations  exert  contractionary  pressure  by  raising  the  price  of  imported
intermediate  goods.
Since  these  contractionary  effects  are  particularly  important  in  the
short  run  (see,  e.g.,  Obstfeld  (1966)),  they  are  serious  potential  liabilities
for  a policy  designed  to  reduce  transitional  unemploymnt.  At  the  least,  the
existence  of  these  effects  liplies  that  the  adjustment path  under  a
devaluation  or  UTCS  may  not  be  sonotonically  superior  over  time  to  th*
adjustment  path  ln  the  absenco of  such a pollcy.
6.  Conclusions
This  paper  has  examined the  similarities  and  dlfferences  between  unifom
trade  taxes  and  exchange  rate  changes  in  a  representative  consumer  setting.
We reached  the  following  concluaions,  In  the  absence  of  illegal  trade  and
under  perfect  capital  mobility:
(1)  A UTCS is  equivalent  in  all  real  respects  to  a  devaluation  of  the
coimercial  exchange rate  in  a dual  rate  system.
(2)  In  terms  of  theIr  effect  on  the  real  value  of  liitial  wealth,  both
policies  mentioned in  (1)  are more contractionary  than  an  across-the-board
noinal  wage.
43devaluation  or  a  rovuluation  of  the  financial  rate  in  a  dual  rate  system,
snec  the  lattor  alternatives  only  affect  wealth  denominated  in  domestlc
currency.
(3) In  terus  of  effects  on  the  real  interest  rate,  a  temporary  UTCS  is
identLeal  to  a  variable  dual  exchange  rate  regime,  where  only  movoemnts  in  the
gap  between  the  comercial  and  financial  rates  matter.  Antieipated  across-
the-board  exchange  rate  sovements,  in  contrast,  do  not  affect  incentlves  for
intertemporal  trade.
(4)  UTCS  policies  do not  affect  the  opportunity  cost  of  domestic  currency,
end  therefore  have  no  portfolio  implications,  unless  they  chang.  expectations
regardLng  the  exchange  rate  applied  to  financial  transactions.
It  is  not  surprLsing  that  when the  posslbility  of  illegal  trade  is  taken
lnto  account,  the  equivalence  between  uniform  trade  taxes  and  exchange  rate
changes  is  broken.  go  examined  both  smuggling  and  customs  fraud  in  a  one-
period,  three-sector  nodel  in  which  devaluations  had  no  real  effects  when
trade  taxes  were  zero,  and  showed that  with  both  types  of  illogal  trade,
introduction  of  a  UTCS  schemo wa  capable  of  changing  the  real  exchange  rate.
It  ls  strikLig,  however,  that  in  tho  muggling  case,  using  a  UTCS  to  raise  the
domestlc  relative  price  of  traded  goods  say  backfilre  and  end  up  actually
mni.ezlzag  the  real  exchange  rate  In  terms  of  importables.  In  the  customs
fraud  case,  the  we get  an  appreclatlon  of  the  real  exchange  rate  in  terms  of
lportables,  but  the  real  exchange  rate  in  torm  of  cxportables  will
depreciate.
Three  extensions  of  this  paper  are  important  before  we have  a  reasonably
full  understandLng  of  the  macroeconomLis  of  UTCS  schemes.  The  fLrst  is  to
44Incorporate  distortionary  wmeai  of  goverrdnt  financo  into  the  illogal  trade
analysis.  Sections  3  and  4  emphasisz  that  one  of  the  priLary  results  of  a
UTCS  scheme  Ln  the  presence  of  Illegal  trade  is  a  trans&*r  of  Lncomo  from  the
publlc  to  the  private  sector.  This  revenue  shock  is  likely  to  add  to  the
welfare  burden  of  the  UTCS  scheoe  in  the  absence of  lump-sum  taxes.
The  second  extension  is  to  add  lnvestmont  to  the  model  and  investiate
tho  relationship  between  investment  response,  the  rel exchange  rat.,  and
fiscal  rovenues  under  a  UTCS  whon the  government  does  not  have  lump-sun  taxes.
The key  Issue  here  is  that  while  the  tariff  component  of  a  UTCS  satisfies  both
the  relative  price  end  the  revenue  objectives  of  the  governuent
simultaneously,  the  export  subsidy  component bringa  out  a  confliet  betweon
these  two  objectives.  The  goverment  may therefore  have  an  incentive  to
reneg  on  the  export  subsidy  component  of  the  package.
Finally,  our  assuuption  of  price  and  wage  floxibllity  severely  limits  the
real  balance  and  relative  price  effects  that  are  the  traditional  channels  for
real  effects  of  devaluations  and  UTCS  schmes. We indicated  ln  Section  5 how
a  parity  change  or  UTCS  could  bo  used  to  alleviate  a  tranaLtional
unamploymentO  problem  due  to  sticky  nominal  wages  in  the  short  run. It  would
be  useful  to  work  through  this  mnalysis  in  detail  in  a  two-sector  production
version  of  the  intertemporal  model  of  Section  2. This  wrvrld  make  it  possible
to  examine  the  tradooffs  between  the  direct  contractionary  effects  of  the
alternative  polleL  s  and  their  expansionary  effect  through  the  tradeables
product  wage.
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